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ABSTRACT 
 
The convergence criteria group together those macro variables whose dimensions 
mean to put in good use, to potentiate and to strengthen the major benefits of 
integration, as their configuration, either before and especially after the adhesion in 
EU, represents strict and compulsory requirements for each state. The very reason 
stands in the strategic target of adopting euro currency, as an advanced phase of the 
integration which thus brings together the negative integration – meaning the abolition 
of the various obstacles in common market functioning -, with the positive integration – 
that means that minimum action of the public authority mainly aimed to ensure the 
coordination and harmonization of the economic policies. 
 
Either budgetary deficit and public debt contain the quintessence of the convergence 
efforts in taking into account the public finance, since both indicators exhaustively 
mirror the government’s administration and interventionism, and reflect its practices 
and macroeconomic policies strategies. At the same time, they contain information and 
facilitate estimation and prognosis concerning not only that country’s estate and 
future, but the Union’s stability and future as well, since it represents an integrated 
system of many countries, a unitary whole of common goals and interests. 
 
The globalisation is the outstanding economy’s characteristic either in present and 
future tense, which is a fact obviously confirmed by the propagated negative effects of 
the recent financial crises. The increasing importance of evaluating each country’s 
budgetary deficit and public debt, as much as each country is a part of a whole, is 
henceforth a reliable link for the member states of this great system. The globalisation 
also favours the access and the extension of a multitude and various risks, which are 
able to penetrate through any split of any size. These public finance indicators are 
instruments enabled to operate as a primary and decisive court meant to signal and to 
preview the threatens against the system’s structure and stability, to prevent and 
remove these dangers, and also to heal long-term and bad effects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The creation and acceptance of the euro area in 1999, a key landmark in the history of 
European integration, were proofs of highest confidence in Europe as a whole and 
challenges in the context of the global economy. As unique currency, euro caused a 
host of transformations all over the euro-area that were planned to increase the 
competition in a global economy, to sustain and to spread the well-known economic 
stability of the core countries.  
 
Actually, euro means the fulfilment of the common market, the very warrant of the four 
liberties; although a political and institutional profound reform was necessary. By the 
anniversary of its first decade, euro area witnessed the macroeconomic stability, an 
essential prerequisite for a sound and lasting economic growth as characterised in the 
recent past years. 
 
The creation and the simultaneous acceptance of the euro currency by many different 
countries were preceded by a process of nominal convergence that determined 
important effects on the economies of participating countries; it also led to convergence 
of public finances, associated with notable differences in the behaviour of key 
macroeconomic aggregates. Compared to the core countries, some of the converging 
countries experienced a boom in domestic demand and a severe deterioration of their 
current account and budgetary deficits. 
Key macroeconomic variables in each of the converging countries were affected by a 
host of specific shocks, including common shocks emanating from the global 
environment (e.g. changes in world demand, world interests rates and oil prices) and 
country specific shocks as well. 
 
According to the 121st article of the Treaty, the sustainable character of the public 
finances results from a budgetary situation that does not know an excessive public 
deficit by the meaning and definition of the 104
th
 article, 6
th
 line. In its turn, this article 
states that the European Commission makes a report about the member state that does 
not cope with the requirements of the fiscal discipline, especially when: 
a) The planned or effective deficit rate to GDP exceeds 3% as reference value, except 
for: 
- Significant and firm diminution up to the reference value, or 
- It is only an exceptional and temporary exceeding and the respective rate is 
sustainably close to the reference rate; 
b) Public debt rate to GDP exceeds 60% as reference value, unless this rate is 
sufficiently diminishing satisfactorily close to the reference value. 
 
At the same time, EU Commission’s Report has to take into account the investments 
expenditures and the economic and budgetary member state’s medium-term position as 
well. In this report, the EU Commission is also enabled to warn that there is a risk of an 
excessive deficit despite the fulfilment of the convergence criteria. 
 
With a view to analyzing the convergence, the ECB has to express its opinions 
regarding the fiscal development, following the evolution of the main variables during 
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1998-2007 periods, to estimate the perspectives and challenges concerning the public 
finance and then it focuses on the connexions between deficit and debt trends. 
 
The ECB’s analysis is grounded upon the data that are extracted from the national 
accounts and in accordance with the European System of Accounts (ESA) 95. 
According to the Maastricht Treaty, the EU Member States also become EMU Member 
States with temporary derogation as about the acceptance of the common currency. 
Firm and rigorous economic policy measures are necessary to be implemented with a 
view to achieving the nominal convergence criteria and to further accomplish the real 
convergence processes. 
 
Table 1: Key European and ECOFIN Council statements on the role of  
quality of public finances, 2000-2007 
 
Date Statements/ Key issues 
Lisbon, 
March 2000 
The European Council called for using the "opportunity provided by 
growth (...) to pursue fiscal consolidation more actively and to improve 
the quality and sustainability of public finances" and requested the 
Council and the Commission to present a report by Spring 2001 on the 
contributions of public finance to growth and employment. 
Santa Maria 
de Feira, 
June 2000 
The European Council encouraged Member States to "review the quality 
and performance of public administration with a view to the definition of 
a European system of benchmarking and best practices." 
Barcelona, 
March 2002 
The European Council endorsed a Key Issues Paper, which defined 
quality of public finances as "achieving the appropriate structure of 
government revenues and expenditures to ensure sound and sustainable 
public finances while raising the potential growth of Union economies. 
In this light, tax and spending reforms must aim at creating the 
conditions to foster employment and investment, while adhering to the 
medium-term objective of a budgetary position close-to-balance or in 
surplus."  
Brussels July 
2005, 
The European Council endorsed amendments to two regulations 
(1466/97 and 1467/97) that underpin the Stability and Growth Pact and 
which, among other revisions, take better account of the quality of public 
finances (QPF).  
Brussels, 
March 2006 
The European Council underlined "the need to further improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public spending and taxes in order to 
enhance the quality of public finances and foster growth and 
employment enhancing activities, in line with the priorities of the 
partnership for growth and employment." 
ECOFIN 
Council, 
Luxembourg, 
October 
2006 
The ECOFIN Council stressed that the revised SGP underlines the 
important role that national fiscal rules and institutions can play in 
attaining sound budgetary positions and respecting the provisions of the 
Treaty and that national institutions could play a more prominent role in 
budgetary surveillance. Coupled with appropriate structural reforms, 
national fiscal rules and institutions can also contribute to improving the 
efficiency of public expenditure. 
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Brussels, 
March 2007 
The European Council reiterated the need to further consolidate public 
budgets and safeguard the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Moreover, it stated that "the quality of public finances needs to be 
improved by raising efficiency and effectiveness of spending, by 
restructuring public expenditure in support of measures that promote 
productivity and innovation and by strengthening human capital with a 
view to raising the long-term growth potential of the economy." 
ECOFIN 
Council, 
Luxembourg, 
October 
2007 
The ECOFIN Council confirmed the importance of national fiscal rules 
and institutions. Also, it"(...) underlined that the modernization of public 
administrations can play an important role in enhancing competitiveness, 
delivering better services achieving better value for money and ensuring 
the control of government expenditure." (...) It invited the Commission 
to step up their efforts to improve the analysis, methodology and the 
measurement of the QPF, including the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public expenditures and revenue structures, as well as of major public 
sector reforms 
 
Sources:  http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm); European Commission - “Public 
Finances in EMU” – Oct. 2008, p.130 
 
 
2. NECESSARY POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL DETAILS 
 
The real convergence processes are equivalent to the diminution prices and 
productivity cross-border countries gaps, meaning the incomes increases in the 
developing countries up to the level from the industrialized developed countries ones. 
Although the real convergence criteria are not explicitly mentioned in the Maastricht 
Treaty, these complex processes are revealed by the level of GDP per capita under the 
Purchasing Power standards (PPS). 
 
The fiscal convergence criteria urged the EU countries to consolidate public finances 
from the early – 1990’s onwards in the run-up to the EMU on January 1999, when 
many EU legacy currencies were replaced by the euro. More recently, the adoption of 
the EU fiscal framework by the New Member States, when they joined the EU, has 
triggered changes in fiscal behaviour, as they are seeking to pursue sound fiscal 
policies within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact 
 
The convergence plan is firstly assessing the sustainable development opportunities 
under conditions of implementing the convergence itself, also taking into account the 
utmost importance of the advantages offered by the accession to the EU. Nominal 
convergence pace and timing should be established as to avoid delays and distortions in 
the real convergence actions. An excessively rapid pace of the nominal convergence 
could jeopardise its own sustainability, while its positive implications could be 
accompanied by short-run tensions among them. 
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3. STATISTICALLY TALKING 
 
In 2007, the government deficit of both the euro area (EA 15) and the EU 27 fell 
compared with 2006, while the government debt increased in absolute terms. In the 
euro area the government deficit decreased from 1.3% of GDP in 2006 to 0.6% in 
2007, and in the EU 27 it fell from 1.4% to 0.9%. In the euro area the government debt 
to GDP ratio fell from 68.5% at the end of 2006 to 66.3% at the end of 2007, and in the 
EU 27 from 61.3% to 58.7%. 
 
Table 2: Dynamics in EU public finances reports 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Euro area (EA15)    
GDP market prices (mp) (mil. Euros) 7 820 461 8 110 080 8 504 375 8 927 499 
Government deficit (-) / 
surplus (+) 
(mil. Euros) 
-228 612 -203 031 -107 956 -55 538 
 % of GDP -2.9 -2.5 -1.3 -0.6 
Government expenditure % of GDP 47.6 47.4 46.7 46.1 
Government revenue % of GDP 44.6 44.8 45.4 45.5 
Government debt (mil. Euros) 5 442 080 5 692 630 5 822 676 5 920 457 
 % of GDP 69.6 70 2 68.5 66.3 
EU27    
GDP mp (mil. Euros) 10 602 75911 062 422 11 672 98812 342 115 
Government deficit (-) / 
surplus (+) 
(mil. euro) 
-303 952 -270 312 -165 793 -106 029 
 % of GDP -2.9 -2.4 -1.4 -0.9 
Government expenditure % of GDP 46.9 46.9 46.3 45.8 
Government revenue % of GDP 44.0 44.4 44.9 45.0 
Government debt (mil. Euros) 6 590 308 6 931 301 7 158 749 7 249 553 
 % of GDP 62.2 62.7 61.3 58.7 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat 
 
Figure 1 Dynamics of EA15's GDP 
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Figure 2 Dynamics of EA15 
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Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat - author’s calculations 
 
The largest government deficits in percentage of GDP were recorded in 2007 by 
Hungary (-5.0%), Greece (-3.5%), France (2.7%) and Romania (2.6%). Among the 
Member States that registered a government surplus in 2007 are the following: 
Slovenia (+0.5%), Bulgaria and Latvia (+0.1%). In all, 16 Member states recorded an 
improved government balance relative to GDP in 2007 compared with 2006, while 11 a 
worsening.  
 
Government expenditures in the euro area were equivalent to 46.1% of GDP, while in 
the EU 27 were 45.8%. As for the government revenues, documents indicate a ratio of 
almost 45.5% both in euro area and in EU 27. Between 2006 and 2007 there was a 
similar trend in both zones: the government expenditures ratio decreased, while the 
government revenue ratio increased slightly. 
 
In the last two decades of the twentieth century the slow pace of economic growth and 
the costs of economic integration have put strong pressure on European government 
budgets. During these period governments have completed large cuts in public 
investment spending and have postponed tax reforms. 
 
Due to the recent evolution in economic growth and the improvements of fiscal balance 
asked by the EMU construction, the European countries should undertake deficit 
financed of many structural reforms. Resorting to borrowing to finance structural 
policies is indeed justified even in a growth context, as long as it shifts burden of 
spending payments to the time where the policies imply benefits.   
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Table 3: General government debt  
(general government consolidated gross debt) % of GDP 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Euro area 68.7 68.3 68.1 69.3 69.7 70.3 68.6 66.6 
Bulgaria 74.3 67.3 53.6 45.9 37.9 29.2 22.7 18.2 
Czech 
Republic 
18.5 25.1 28.5 30.1 30,4- 29.7 29.4 28.7 
Hungary 54.3 52.1 55.7 58.0 59.4 61.6 65.6 66.0 
Poland 36.8 37.6 42.2 47.1 45.7 47.1 47.6 45.2 
Romania 24.7 26.0 25.0 21.5 18.8 15.8 12.4 13.0 
Slovenia  27.2 28.4 27.9 27.6 27.5 27.2 24.1 
Slovakia 50.4 49.0 43.4 42.4 41.4 34.2 30.4 29.4 
 
Source: EUROSTAT, “The European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States” - Statistical 
comparison, 2008 edition; ECB, Monthly Bulletin, February, 2009 
 
At the end of 2007, the lowest ratios of government debt to GDP were recorded in 
Estonia (3.5%), Luxembourg (7%), Latvia (9.5) % and Romania (12.9%), while eight 
Member States, among which was Hungary, had government debt ratios higher than 
60.0% of GDP. 
  
Specific literature about the consequences of new member states’ EMU entry reveals 
that an initial increase of consumption causes afterwards an increase of both domestic 
and external deficit. They consider the driver of adjustment is convergence in interest 
rates between core (home) and converging (new member) countries. The explanation is 
that firstly, new members experience a sharp increase in household expenditures, 
accompanied by a current account deficit and the accumulation of a net debtor position 
with respect to the core (home) countries – and secondly, the initial sharp adjustment is 
followed by a process of slow adjustment reflecting the evolution of foreign 
liabilities/assets. After an initial jump, it declines gradually over time, reflecting the 
gradual increase of home’s share in overall wealth. 
 
0
50
100
150
BE DE IE GR ES ER IT CY LU MT NL AT FT SI SK FI
Figure 4 General gevernment debt 
(general government consolidated gross debt) - % of GDP
Euro area countries
2004 2005 2006 2007
 
 
Source:  ECB, Monthly Bulletin, February, 2009, ECB for euro area aggregated data; European Commission 
for data relating to countries debt 
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4. RECENT (NON) ECONOMIC HISTORY 
 
Since 2004 and then 2007 respectively, a comprehensive wave of ex-socialist countries 
joined the European Union select club, after a certain period of attentively preparing, 
difficultly facing unpredictable challenges and severe targets concerning their social, 
political and macroeconomic development.  
 
The status of convergent countries for this platoon of new EU members was rather 
difficult to acquire and, as in the case of any analysis, the present one also has to take 
into account the decades of hyper centralized economy and society that these countries 
crossed with plenty of sacrifices and tragedies. 
 
The space of the ex-Soviet Union is the starting place of the programme of stimulation 
of competition and initiative by removing (or, for starters, diluting) the state monopoly 
over property. Mechanisms to favour market economy were gradually introduced, 
being considered a sign on maturity, because only in this manner both competition and 
free initiative might have an open way. Along with the deepening of the problems 
related to international alignment and the political consequences resulted from the 
dismemberment of the ex-USSR, the institutional and functional reforms not only 
slowed down but an attitude of rejection of the population regarding private property 
and initiative became general; after the egalitarian tradition had ossified, the crises of 
the transitional process often took the shape of an explicit hostility towards differently 
distributed well-being. This is how serious phenomena of corruption and violence 
appeared and intensified, their amplitude being typical for all countries and 
representing a serious brake in the evolution of reforms. 
 
A fierce confrontation of ideas and vivid theoretical polemics were recorded in 
connection to the ample transitional process started after the collapse of the totalitarian 
regimes according to the domino principle last millennium. As common ground, they 
had the same approach: treating transition outside standard models referring to 
competition and allotting of resources and well-being. 
 
On a theoretical level, numberless programs and models were formulated and brought 
under discussion with a more or less declared appearance of miracle, of certain and 
indubitable universal panaceas but, unfortunately, these plans and formulas could 
hardly prove their viability, and if this happened, entirely exceptionally, it was only 
partially and only for a certain period and form. 
 
However, in spite of the numerous controversies that still linger among politicians and 
scientists alike, there is a plus of coherence in the pragmatic conceptions that visualize 
this process through IMF’s glasses, that is according to the amplitude and degree of 
propagation of the main internal and external unbalances, to the extent of market use, 
as well as to the degree of decentralizing the macroeconomic management.   
 
The transitional process meant the reformation of the entire system; however, this 
complicated and dramatic process implies many and profound uncertainties, huge costs 
that are difficult to anticipate. This is why, at the end of approximately two decades of 
transition, this period is evaluated with different eyes; it is long and with poor or even 
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doubtful results which, here and there, determined not only the blocking of reforms, but 
also the regeneration of opposition towards change, consolidated the old rigidities 
instead of a long expected and just restructuring of the institutions and values.  
 
The prerequisites of the differentiations regarding the unbalances can be the basis on 
which reformatory measures can be ordered, their duration and sequence of 
implementation in order to build the market economy can be assessed. From this angle, 
according to some specialists, certain criteria of making a hierarchy of those countries 
that have experimented transition can be detected as well. 
 
For instance, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland are considered to 
have benefited from much more attractive and favourable circumstances to rapidly and 
efficiently apply and assess certain pertinent structural reforms, unlike Romania and 
Bulgaria, where such measures are still delayed or applied in a distortional manner. 
 
The explanation resides in the superior degree of certain essential balances that are 
functioning in the case of the former, whilst the latter experienced a higher level 
centralization of government’s decision and intervention. Keeping this background in 
mind, the relatively superior flexibility of the countries belonging to the first category 
ensured them an increased acceleration in their passing towards a democratic society, 
since they had passed the phases of creating and consolidating the essential elements of 
this purpose, namely: general consensus of social and political order, stabilization and 
macroeconomic control, prices, market and companies reform, privatization and a more 
clearly outlined perception of the role of the state. 
 
The defining characteristics of these countries’ evolution have included:  
a) the upward dynamics of production and GDP, as a result of the positive evolution 
of the indices referring to growth which show that the main sustaining factor was 
the expansion of exports towards western countries, especially after the dilution of 
the recession the latter countries crossed at the beginning of the 10
th
 decade, but 
also as an expression of the perspective political and economic orientations of 
these countries; 
b) the control and reduction of the annual rates of inflation, by adopting certain 
restrictive budgetary and monetary policies which, though did not end up into an 
acceptable reduction of unemployment and inflation, ensured these indices 
premises of control and reduction in time; it is worth mentioning the effort to stay 
within the limits of budgetary deficits, as it had been agreed with or recommended 
by IMF officials; 
c) the improvement of the commercial balance and of the current accounts 
determined the reduction of the external unbalances, both on account of the 
depreciation of the national currency, as well as by reducing the unitary production 
costs, as a sign of advancing along the line of restructuring the real sector; besides 
the increase of exports, another favouring elements in terms of the external balance 
was the relative reduction of imports, also caused by the commercial measures of 
protectionist nature. 
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In spite of the fact that a series of inherent differences among countries and periods is 
still logically present, one may resort to a global assessment of the results of the first 
decade of re-conversion to capitalism. 
 
Table 4: Government deficit/surplus & public debt (% of GDP) 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 
Deficit/surplus 1.6 1.9 3.0 0.1 
Bulgaria 
Debt 37.9 29.2 22.7 18.2 
Deficit/surplus –3.0 –3.6 –2.7 –1.0 
Czech Republic 
Debt 30.4 29.8 29.6 28.9 
Deficit/surplus –6.4 –7.8 –9.3 –5.0 
Hungary 
Debt 59.4 61.7 65.6 65.8 
Deficit/surplus –5.7 –4.3 –3.8 –2.0 
Poland 
Debt 45.7 47.1 47.7 44.9 
Deficit/surplus –1.2 –1.2 –4.2 –2.6 
Romania 
Debt 18.8 15.8 12.4 12.9 
Deficit/surplus –2.2 –1.4 –1.2 0.5 
Slovenia** 
Debt 27.2 27.0 26.7 23.4 
Deficit/surplus –2.3 –2.8 –3.5 –1.9 
Slovakia 
Debt 41.4 34.2 30.4 29.4 
 
Note:  *Estimated data 
** Recently EMU member state 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat - author’s calculation 
 
Poland has witnessed the most abrupt transformations under the guidance of the well-
known clandestine union movement Solidarity, which, becoming the governing 
political party after 1989, took over and administered a disastrous “inheritance”. The 
social-democratic impulse of perpetuating the subsidies of prices for social protection 
purposes overlapped with the inherent restraints of a competition-based economy and 
with an overwhelming external debt (approximately 40 billions USD). The prices were 
liberalized and the salaries rigorously controlled so that, together with incentives for 
foreign capital investments, privatization and devaluation, the way to social and 
economic behaviours was wide open towards development and competition. The 
program entitled “shock therapy” pulverized the social consensus accumulated before 
1990, demonstrating the failure of undecided and hesitating measures but determining, 
nevertheless, at the same time, the fall into a multifaceted crisis, also accentuated by 
the loss of faith in the infallibility of certain landmarks. 
 
Hungary stepped with equal determination towards market economy ever since the 
‘70s, when the private commercial banks were legalized in a practically generalized 
context of economy privatization. It is considered that this was ingredient that ensured 
the social stability of the reforming measures in spite of the fact that austerity measures 
regarding the freezing of salaries have been taken during the latest years and that the 
external debt of the country is more than significant. The rhythm of reforms does not 
require a high speed anymore already and the surmounting of the difficulties has new, 
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palpable achievement perspectives based on foreign assistance drawn by the plus of 
credibility. 
 
A different case in point is the ex-Czechoslovakia, which had the highest GDP of all 
eastern-central European countries as well as a slender external debt; despite all the 
advantages of the general consensus and of the relative prosperity, the government’s 
requests that the population should consent to a number of sacrifices generated 
disturbances of the balance which ended up in the consensual and peaceful scission of 
the country into two distinctive state entities: The Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
 
Bulgaria began the reforms in February 1990, when the government program of state-
owned companies’ flexibility was in fact the expression of choosing a gradual 
transition. The liberalization of prices was only partial – for luxury products especially; 
the prices for basic food products and those considered strategic, such as oil and steel, 
continued to work in a centralized manner and by public subsidy, precisely not to 
imperil the precarious social stability and support. 
 
Eastern Germany took a completely different trajectory, taking into account the 
position of maximum advantage conferred by its western “sister”; this fact also 
favoured its admittance into the European Union, practically by an “adoption”, not only 
unconditional but also protected against the tribulations and costs of the stern programs 
that the other transitional processes were forced to endure. 
  
The figures below contain the dynamics of the macro variables in some ex-socialist 
countries that are reflecting the convergence process and the tendencies they follow: 
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Table 5: Public finances dynamics tending to EMU 
 
Public finances variables 
Country year Excessive deficit 
procedure 
Public 
administration 
deficit 
Gross Public 
debt  
2006 - 3.0 22.7 
2007 No 3.4 18.2 Bulgaria 
2008 No 3.2 14.1 
2006 Yes -2.7 29.4 
2007 Yes -1.6 28.7 
Czech 
Republic 
2008 Yes -1.4 28.1 
2006 Yes -9.2 65.6 
2007 Yes -5.5 66.0 Hungary 
2008 Yes -4.0 66,5 
2006 Yes -3.8 47.6 
2007 Yes -2.0 45.2 Poland 
2008 Yes -2.5 44.5 
2006 - -2.2 12.4 
2007 No -2.5 13.0 Romania 
2008 No -2.9 13.6 
2006 Yes -3.6 30.4 
2007 Yes -2.2 29.4 Slovakia 
2008 Yes -2.0 29.2 
 
Source: ECB, Convergence Annual Report, May, 2008 – author’s calculations 
 
Besides economic conditions, there are certain general characteristics of the post 
transitional economies, such as: fragmentation of decision-making, ideology of the 
party in government and especially the closeness of elections. These are impact 
elements for the efficiency of the fiscal policy in general and in the adjustment 
strategies in particular. 
 
 
5.  OVERALL ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
In the second half of 2008, signs of weaker economic activity started to emerge in the 
largest central and eastern European EU countries. For instance, third-quarter GDP 
data for Hungary show that the economy contracted by 0.1% quarter on quarter. In the 
Czech Republic and Poland, real GDP growth fell slightly in the third quarter, to 0.9% 
and 1.2% respectively. Short-term indicators point to a further reduction in growth in 
both countries. In Romania, real GDP growth remained strong in the third quarter 
(partly driven by a good harvest in the agricultural sector), but short-term indicators 
suggest a marked decline in more recent months.  
 
The macroeconomic outlook has worsened substantially in the past few months in all 
four countries as a result of increased risk aversion towards the region, tighter 
financing conditions and contracting international trade. Annual inflation rates have 
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declined, falling in December to 6.4% in Romania, 3.4% in Hungary and 3.3% in the 
Czech Republic and Poland. EMU represents the 3
rd
 stage of the economic and 
monetary union. The convergence criteria are designed to guarantee that prior to 
joining the EMU, countries attain a high of economic convergence both in real and in 
nominal convergence.  These criteria affect the way fiscal and monetary policy should 
be conducted in the EMU accession countries. Since each of the Central Eastern 
European countries signed the Maastricht Treaty, it also includes their obligation to 
enter the EMU in the near future. As stated in the Treaty, these countries are required to 
satisfy certain restrictions on their debt and deficit policy. 
 
Testing convergence by the budgetary deficit. There are four countries that are the 
object of an EU Council decision referring to an excessive deficit procedure. According 
to the data that are recorded in May 2008, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and 
Slovakia are in this procedure after the data of 2006. Ironically, it is worth to mention 
that, at a value of only 2.5 % of GDP deficit in 2007, Romania was far from the 
excessive deficit procedure and moreover, a deficit of only 2.9 % of GDP was 
predicted for 2008. Unfortunately, by the end of 2008, Romania’s deficit was 
overtaking even the 5 % to GDP threshold, meaning a certain qualification for the 
excessive deficit procedure. 
 
Testing convergence by public debt. According to the same document, these countries’ 
public debt reveals lower values than the threshold of 60% to GDP ratio, except for 
Hungary, but with descending tendencies for the near future. The same trend is 
followed by Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and 
Bulgaria, mainly due to the diminishing the primary budgetary deficit. 
As for Romania, the amount of the public debt was only 13 % to GDP in 2007, and the 
prognosis for 2008 showed a slight increase in the relative value, insignificant from the 
reference value. 
 
There is a large literature on the impact of the monetary policy on economic activity, 
whilst fiscal policy has received less attention and its importance for economic 
stabilization has been typically neglected. The recent financial turmoil has, however, 
revived the interest of academia, central bankers and governments on the role of fiscal 
policy. When analysing the role of fiscal policy in the context of a monetary union, 
certain studies show that there is a stabilizing role for fiscal policy, that goes beyond 
the efficient provision of public goods, as monetary policy is conducted by common 
central bank, while fiscal policy is implemented at the country level.      
     
As a stabilizer of macroeconomics, the fiscal policy should be approached according to 
the phase of the economic cycle, i.e. more lax within a recession and more restrictive 
within a boom. The identification of the fiscal structural stance allows the assignment 
of the fiscal policy as a macro stabilizer. Structural fiscal position is the prevailing part 
of the deficit while there is no influence from the economic cycle.  
 
The structural fiscal position may be considered in dynamics from the perspective of 
the fiscal stance, as long as this reflects the modification of the structural fiscal 
position from one moment to another. As an alternative, the fiscal impulse could be 
also relevant, because it is equal to the fiscal stance, but with an opposite sign. For 
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instance, a positive fiscal impulse indicates a laxer fiscal policy that could imply 
inflationary effects, although the effective deficits indicate a decrease. 
 
When the fiscal impulse is operating in the same time with an excessive demand, one 
can state that there is a pro cyclical fiscal policy, meaning not only a failure as a macro 
stabilizer, but even an inflation amplifier because of the excessive demand. It is worth 
to mention that ESA 95 Standard means an accrual system of registration based on 
agreements, not only on effective payments. 
 
 
6. CONVERGENCE TO EMU THROUGH THE TEST OF PUBLIC FINANCE 
 
In Romania, the relevant changes began to produce good results since 2000, when the 
stability and functioning of the economy were achieved on basis of new principles. 
Henceforth, convergence scenarios and calculation should be considered from 2000 on, 
as they gained significance and credibility for the future evolution of Romania’s 
economy and it began a normal development. Romania’s fiscal policy was a pro 
cyclical one based upon unrealistic estimations of the revenues and exaggerated growth 
of the expenditures that induced significant macroeconomic imbalances, especially for 
the current account and the high rate of inflation.  
 
The tendency of contracting the economic activity has visibly further emphasised by 
the beginning of 2009, but a recovery of the domestic supply and demand is expected 
as EU’ efforts of economic and financial setting rights are to be seen. Despite a 
possible decrease under the limit of 1% to GDP ratio, the macroeconomic framework 
predicts a growth with 2.5% as against 2008. 
 
 Figure 5 Government revenues and expenditures (% ratios to GDP) 
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Although planned at a 37.2% to GDP ratio, the public revenues were but 32% to GDP 
ratio accomplished while the expansionary policy of the expenditures caused a deficit 
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of 4.8 % to GDP ratio – according to cash methodology, and 5.2% to GDP ratio 
following the ESA - 95 manner. One can evaluate this as a totally unacceptable 
situation after almost 8% growth ratio in 2008. 
 
An additional reason to worry about is their inefficient orientation towards salaries and 
many different non-durable goods and services.  
 
In the 4th quarter of 2008 the general government’s expenditures raised by 30 per cent 
compared to the previous period, while the budgetary revenues diminished by 2.6 per 
cent. It means that the corresponding quarterly budgetary deficit was about 16 billion 
ROL, as against only 2 billion ROL in the previous quarter. 
 
Figure 6 Quarterly budgetary revenues/expenditures during 2008 (bill ROL) 
 
   
 
 
Source: www.guv.ro  
 
Figure 7 The Fiscal Deficit (% to GDP ratio) 
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Source: NBR, www.bnr.ro 
 
There are some aspects that also confirm the negative impact of the deficit as reported 
by the end of 2008, such as: 
- the amount of the unobserved economy that raised from 14.5 % to GDP in 2004, to 
21 % to GDP in 2008, meaning a 3 times increase during the period 2005 – 2008; 
- the free labour makes the important part of the unobserved economy, at about 51 % 
of the whole and 11 % of the GDP; 
- the fiscal avoidance by VAT paying increased to 24 billion ROL, as against 7.4 bill 
ROL in 2004, and meaning 5% to GDP. 
 
Fiscal policy effects upon 2009 trends can be analysed as follows: 
Q1 Q2 Q 3 Q4
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41
42
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30
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External effects. The overtaking of 3 per cent of GDP budgetary deficit as SGP stated 
ratio exposes Romania to the excessive deficit procedure; additionally, the 
international rating agencies severely penalised Romania with (BBB-) note, that is to 
trigger negative consequences concerning the financing of the government’s foreign 
debt. Both deficit and fiscal unpredictability lead to a lack of the foreign investors’ 
trust in the Romanian economy’s perspectives. Thus, during the 4
th
 quarter only the 
FDI flows decreased twice, from 943 million Euros in October, to 400 million Euros 
in December 2008.  
 
Domestic effects: over 1.5 of GDP, meaning 2.1 bill Euros, were central and local 
public administration’s unpaid claims to certain economic companies and that induced 
a sudden contraction of the economic activity, especially in building construction;  
◘ the government debt was 16.4 billion ROL by November 2008 more than 2007, 
because of financing an unexpected deficit, considering the international financial 
turmoil additionally. Thus, Romania has to face a very hostile and difficult economic 
environment, taking into account the necessity of shortening the public expenditures 
and deficit too. Moreover, the slow absorption of the EU structural funds made an 
important surface of land not to be used for agricultural purposes. 
 
Government debt. The real increase of public debt by the end of November 2008 as 
compared to 2007 was due both to the necessity of deficit financing and to the 
valuation of the debt which was denominated I foreign currency. The depreciation of 
the national currency to EUR and USD also contributed in a great extent to increasing 
the foreign debt burden. 
 
Figure 8 Dynamics in the government’s debt 
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The debt of 16.4 billion ROL more than 2007 was caused while financing the deficit 
and by the temporary financing from the general current account of the State Treasury. 
Credits contracted with domestic and foreign investors raised with an amount of 8.4 %, 
while the temporary financing from the State Treasury increased with 28.9 %, i.e. 8.5 
billion ROL compared to 2007.    
 
The structure of credit’s initial duration reveals that 53 percent consist of medium and 
long term contracted loans (over 1 year), but 47 % is represented b short-term debt that 
would further increase the high risk in refining the government debt.   
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Figure 9: The structure of the Public Debt (% to GDP ratio) 
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Source: www.guv.ro 
 
Considering the interest rate, 65.7 % of total debt is contracted under a floating interest 
rate, showing high interest rate risk accompanying the public debt. 
 
 
7.  ROMANIA’S PERSPECTIVES FOR THE ADOPTION OF EURO 
 
For the post-accession period and with a view to adopting the Euro, main strategically 
objectives are to be followed by each accessing country: 
- the consolidation of a low inflationary rate; 
- the consolidation of the domestic long-term capital market and the convergence of 
interest rate; 
- the relative sustainability of the exchange rate around the equilibrium long-term 
level. 
 
One can appreciate that Romania’s preparations for the EU accession took a right way 
beginning with 2000, when also targeting the inflation started, as this was the most 
serious threat for the converging process. Therefore, all necessary measures of 
monetary policy were constantly taken to fulfil this major objective. Additionally, the 
crisis risk that was already perceived by the Romanian economic reality of 1998-99 
periods raised the issue of a monetary council.  
 
Contrary to Bulgaria, with which joined EU in January 1, 2007, Romania chose an 
autonomous monetary policy taking into account the following pertinent explanations: 
- quasi-deficit were larger than the fiscal ones and were not apt to be influenced by 
regime switch; 
- an insufficient level of foreign exchange reserves; 
- the fragile banking sector that was not restructured yet. 
 
Therefore, at least until ERM 2 entry, inflation targeting is to be maintained as the 
strategy ensures a gradual fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria, while supporting the 
real convergence process. The moment of ERM 2 entry is planned by 2012, taking into 
account that 3-4 years after accession would be sufficient both to imply the nominal 
convergence and to significantly progress in the real convergence. The necessary stay 
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in ERM 2 is considered to be 2-3 years, but the NBR officials stated to shorten this 
period until to 2 years as minimum compulsory duration.  
 
Euro adoption is thus expected for Romania in 2014. 
 
Table 6 The Schedule of EMU Accession 
 
Country 
Date of joining 
EU 
Date of joining ERM 
II (target) 
Target for EMU 
entry 
Cyprus 2004 May 2005 2008 
Malta  2004 May 2005 2008 
Poland 2004 Not established yet Not established yet 
Czeck Republic 2004 Not established yet 2012* 
Slovakia 2004 November 2005 2009 
Hungary 2004 Not established yet 2011* 
    
Romania 2007 2012 2014 
 
Note:  *Not before this date 
Source: www.bnr.ro  
 
From one of the latest economic data and survey, available information confirm that 
the euro area and its major trading partners are undergoing an extended period of 
significant economic downturn, and that accordingly, both external and domestic 
inflationary pressures are diminishing. In the euro area, inflation rates are expected to 
be in line with price stability over the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, thereby 
supporting the purchasing power of euro area households. Further deceleration in 
monetary and credit growth reflect and support these trends. Overall, the level of 
uncertainty remains exceptionally high, as economic activity throughout the world has 
weakened substantially, thus underlying the intensified and world-wide – broadened 
financial market turmoil. 
 
The next difficult period the present executive has to implement some very ambitious 
strategically objectives, meant to recover the domestic equilibrium, but also to satisfy 
the convergence criteria: 
- Severely cutting the public administration current expenditures, considering only 
the efficiency and the performance in the public sector and the planned social 
purposes –  
- Allocation oriented to objectives with multiplying effects only, as to limit and 
compensate the reduction of the activity in the private sector during the economic 
recession –  
- Implementing the golden rule of the public finances, i.e. the deficit should finance 
only public investments, while the current revenues should finance only the current 
expenditures –  
- Public debt sustainability means that the foreign debt must be used only to stimulate 
and to support the economic growth –  
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- Approaching a multiannual budgetary strategy meant to plan and to realise 
reasonable medium-term public expenditures and also a target of 1 % to GDP 
deficit to be attained by 2012. 
 
Considering the latest prognosis and our officials’ data and bearing in mind the 
financial global crisis as well, Romania’s situation is relatively difficult not from the 
point of view of the public debt, but of the government’s deficit especially. Romania’s 
FOREX are able to cover 10.3 months imports of goods and services, thus confirming 
the wise monetary measures adopted by NBR.  
 
In a different manner is to be approached the public budgetary deficit that exceeded just 
the most pessimistic expectations and the context of the international turmoil also 
increases the difficulties to be financed and to support the growth, a totally 
unacceptable situation after several years of continuous high growing rate. 
 
The present circumstances mean a crucial important moment where there is but one of 
the two possible ways to choose.  
• Either to choose a “U” economic evolution, i.e. to sacrifice some FOREX now 
and simply jeopardizing our future development under an unexpectedly excessive 
rate of debt, or 
• to choose a “V” economic evolution, meaning resorting to borrowing with a view 
to financing both deficit and credit activity, so that the economy could jump in a 
sudden development that might afford a sustainable budgetary deficit for relatively 
short time in the near future, without compromising its convergence chances to 
EMU. 
 
Romanian officials have opted for the 2nd solution and a borrowing agreement with 
European Commission, European Investments Bank and International Monetary Fund 
was settled these days. Henceforth, a stand-by Agreement for about 2 years was 
discussed upon and accepted between Romania and these international financial 
institutions, so that the economic engines could be restarted, credits could be taken and 
negative impact of the crisis could be mitigated. The agreement that was negotiated 
upon sets also Romania’s obligation to reform certain economic activities, wages and 
pensions systems, to finance the infrastructure building and to sustain the exchange 
rate, as to control the external balances as well. 
 
Moreover, it is worth to mention that Romania’s specific conditions ensured, therefore, 
better terms of negotiations too, referring to the income flat tax, the VAT value and 
other public expenditures necessarily oriented to social purposes. 
 
 
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
As the financial tensions have further impact on the global and domestic economy, 
persistent weakness is also foreseen over the coming quarters in the euro area, despite 
some recent tentative signs of stabilisation in some survey data. However, their 
historically low levels require confirmation on a broader basis. The significant policy 
measures that have been decided upon over recent months are to deal with the financial 
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turmoil and its adverse consequences. They should help to restore trust in the financial 
system and to ease constraints on credit supply both to companies and households. 
 
In order to ensure that such measures effectively support a sustainable recovery, it is of 
utmost importance that they remain focused and temporary in nature, so as to maintain 
a stability oriented and medium-term perspective in macroeconomic policy-making. 
* 
Either budgetary deficit and public debt contain the quintessence of the convergence 
efforts in taking into account the public finance, since both indicators exhaustively 
mirror the government’s administration and interventionism, and reflect its practices 
and macroeconomic policies strategies. At the same time, they contain information and 
facilitate estimation and prognosis concerning not only that country’s estate and future, 
but the Union’s stability and future as well, since it represents an integrated system of 
many countries, a unitary whole of common goals and interests. 
* 
In the difficult period that follows, the present Romanian executive has to implement 
some very ambitious strategically objectives, not only meant to recover the domestic 
equilibrium, but also to satisfy the nominal and real convergence criteria, as a duty to 
respect the commitments assumed by signing the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, Romania is 
constrained – but now, also able – to take firm steps for preventing a fatal slipping from 
the sustainable development path. Therefore, it ought to reformulate the entire 
economic policies, aimed not only to maintain balanced the macro variables, but also 
giving priority to the strategic target that EMU entry requires. 
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